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CODE EXEMPTIONS: FAR-REACHING ACHIEVEMENT
The Honorable Robert L. Hughes*
Some of the most significant changes brought about by the new
Bankruptcy Code concern its treatment of exempt property. In this
Article, Judge Hughes examines the new law of exemptions. He
explores the unique election system set out by the Code, the status
of exempt property, and the broad avoiding powers extended to the
debtor.
Consumers file the majority of the country's bankruptcy cases and no
portion of the new Bankruptcy Code' (the Code) has changed as much law
affecting consumers as its treatment of exempt property. If the drafts-
men applied a fresh coat of paint on the law of discharge and remodeled
the law of dischargeability, they tore down former section six2 and built a
brand new structure in section 522.3 The change is quantitative as well as
qualitative. The legal principles embraced by section six of the 1898 Bank-
ruptcy Act, 4 even after its expansion in 1938, 5 were so sparse as to approach
nonexistence. By contrast, section 522 of the Code affirmatively and exten-
sively deals with almost the entire panoply of exemption issues. No other
nondefinitional section is as thorough.
Indeed, section 522 is one of the Code's most far-reaching achievements.
For the first time since 1877, the bankruptcy statute itself prescribes the amount
and kind of property that is not subject to distribution to creditors. 6
In addition, section 522 provides the debtor with virtually unprecedented
* United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Northern District of California.
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified in 11
U.S.C. and scattered sections of 2, 7, 12, 15, 17-20, 22, 28, 29, 31, 33, 40-43, 46, 48, 49
U.S.C.). The new Bankruptcy Code was enacted on November 6, 1978, and became effective in
substantial part on October 1, 1979. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2682. As this article
was prepared for publication, the most current codification of the Bankruptcy Code was the
1978 Supplement to the United States Code. U.S.C. tit. 11 is set out in an appendix to the
supplement, and the amendments to scattered U.S.C. sections are set forth in the body of the
supplement. Throughout this Article, title 11 will be cited as 11 U.S.C. app. § - (Supp. II
1978). Amendments to scattered U.S.C. sections will be cited as - U.S.C. - (Supp. II 1978).
Title IV of the new Bankruptcy Code, containing the transition provisions, will be cited to Pub.
L. No. 95-598, § -, 92 Stat. _.
2. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 547 (1897-99), as amended by Act
of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 6, 52 Stat. 847 (originally codified at 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976))
(replaced with 11 U.S.C. app. § 522 (Supp. 11 1978)).
3. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522 (Supp. II 1978).
4. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544 (1897-99).
5. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 6, 52 Stat. 847, amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch.
541, § 6, 30 Stat. (1897-99) (codified originally at 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)) (current version at 11
U.S.C. app. § 522 (Supp. II 1978)).
6. These amounts and kinds of exempt property are set forth at 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)
(Supp. I1 1978). See notes 27-72 and accompanying text infra.
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avoiding powers over liens on, or involuntary transfers of, exempt property. 7
An important feature of the new Bankruptcy Code is the provision en-
abling the debtor to select either the uniform federal system of exemptions
provided by the Code, or the state and non-bankruptcy federal exemptions
such as were permitted by the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. 8 In one sense, the
Code's specified exemptions are a federal floor or minimum so that the
debtor is not denied more favorable non-Code exemptions that may be avail-
able.
This Article examines the Code's treatment of exempt property. It first
analyzes the debtor's ability to elect between the two exemption systems,
and follows with a close look at the federal alternative. Next it examines the
status of exempt property. The Article then addresses the broad avoiding
powers the Code extends to debtors. Finally, several procedural and con-
stitutional considerations that have significance when exempting property
are discussed.
THE ELECTION
A full appreciation of the Code's treatment of exemptions requires ac-
quaintance with section 541.9 When a bankruptcy case is filed and an es-
tate created, 10 section 541 determines what interests of the debtor become
the property of this estate. Generally, all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor, wherever located as of the commencement of the case, are in-
cluded. 11 The provisions of section 541 are indeed broad, with the only
apparent property not entering into the estate being the debtor's interest in
a spendthrift trust that is valid under state law. 12
7. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(f)-(i) (Supp. 11 1978).
8. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(b) (Supp. II 1978). See notes 14, 15, and accompanying text infra.
9. 11 U.S.C. app. § 541 (Supp. 11 1978). While an analysis of § 541 is beyond the scope of
this Article, the significance of this section lies in the fact that many property interests that
escape administration under the 1898 Act do not fare as well under the Code. H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-69 (1977).
10. Cases creating such estates may be voluntary, 11 U.S.C. app. § 301 (Supp. 11 1978) (any
entity that is a debtor), joint, id. § 302 (an individual that may be a debtor and such individual's
spouse), or involuntary, id. § 303 (commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of Title 11 and only
against a person, except a farmer or a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commer-
cial corporation, that may be a debtor under the chapter under which the case is commenced).
11. Id. § 541(a)(1).
12. Id. § 541(c)(2). A spendthrift trust is defined as a trust in which the beneficiary is unable
to transfer his or her right to future payments of income or capital and creditors are unable to
subject the beneficiary's interest to the payment of their claims. G. G. BOGART & G. T.
BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 147 (5th ed. 1973). Due to the creditor's inability
to reach a debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust, it is arguable that such a trust is not really a
property interest of a debtor for bankruptcy purposes. If so, § 541(c)(2) is redundant.
Personal injury causes of action provide an example of the Code's broader inclusion of prop-
erty in the estate compared to the old Act. For example, state laws sometimes combined with
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 565 (1897-99), as amended by Chandler
Act, ch. 575, § 70(a), 52 Stat. 879 (1938) (originally codified at 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1976)) (repealed
1026 [Vol. 28:1025
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Once property is part of the estate, the debtor is permitted to claim
exemptions. 13 Section 522(b) provides the debtor with a choice of exemp-
tion systems. The debtor may elect the federal alternative and exempt prop-
erty via the uniform bankruptcy exemptions set forth in section 522(d), 14 or
(1979)), to exclude personal injury causes of action. See, e.g., In re Schmelzer, 480 F.2d 1074
(6th Cir. 1973) (title to a cause of action does not pass to the trustee when the state does not
subject the claim to judicial process); In re Buda, 323 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1973) (same). But see
Carmona v. Robinson, 336 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1964) (because California subjects a personal
injury action to judicial process once it is pending in court, title to such cause of action passes to
the trustee in bankruptcy). Although the Code includes such causes of action in the estate, the
new alternative permits an exemption of payment not to exceed $7,500 due to a personal bodily
injury, 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(11)(D) (Supp. II 1978), and payment in compensation of loss of
future earnings. Id. § 522(d)(11)(E).
13. The statutory concept is first to include all property of the debtor in the estate and then
to allow exemptions. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 368 (1977).
14. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978). The power to enact uniform federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions is derived from the constitutional provision stating that Congress may estab-
lish uniform bankruptcy laws throughout the United States. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The
earliest federal bankruptcy statutes, enacted in 1800 and 1841, provided for uniform federal stan-
dards for exempting property. These laws, however, were short-lived, with Congress repealing
each within three and two years respectively. See Plumb, The Recommendation of the Commis-
sion on the Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REv. 1, 5 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Plumb]; 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1460-61 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Critique].
The Act of 1867 provided for an election between a uniform federal exemption and local state
exemptions. Due to the expense and corruption in its administration, the Act of 1867 was
repealed in 1878. See Plumb, supra at 5; Critique, supra at 1461-62. The Act of 1898, which as
amended had force until the effective date of the Code, gave a bankrupt whatever exemptions
to which he or she might be entitled under the laws of the state of his or her domicile and to
any exemptions that other federal laws made available. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30
Stat. 548 (1897-99), as amended by Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 6, 52 Stat. 847 (1938) (originally
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)) (replaced with 11 U.S.C. app. § 522 (Supp. II 1978)). See
Plumb, supra at 5; Critique, supra at 1462-63. Thus, for the last 80 years the bankruptcy
exemptions have not been uniform.
The policy of deferring to state exemptions was widely criticized. See, e.g., Countryman,
Consumer Bankruptcy-Some Recent Changes and Some Proposals, 19 U. KAN. L. REv. 165,
167-68 (1971); King, Proposed Amendments to the Chandler Act, 45 COM. L.J. 36, 40 (1940);
Critique, supra at 1510-11. The gist of this criticism was: (1) given the great variety among
state exemption laws, the policy promotes unequal treatment of debtors; (2) Congress should
not delegate to state legislatures the important task of determining what property bankrupts
may retain; (3) there is a state rather than a federal priority for exemptions; and (4) references to
non-bankruptcy law results in much litigation. See Vukowich, The Bankruptcy Commission's
Proposal Regarding Bankrupt's Exemption Rights, 63 CAL. L. REv. 1439, 1441-44 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as Vukowich]. In light of this criticism, the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States proposed in 1973 that Congress avoid the unfairness of state exemptions by enact-
ing a uniform system of exemptions in bankruptcy. Thereafter, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Exemption Act in 1976. See Uni-
form Exemptions Act, U.L.A. CIVIL PROC. & REM. LAws 7-9 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
UEA]. See also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977). Although § 522, as
enacted by Congress, generally follows the Bankruptcy Commission's proposals, one major de-
parture was the inclusion of the election between the bankruptcy-specified exemptions and the
existing state and federal exemptions. This alternative approach was proposed by the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges in the so-called "Judges' Bill." H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). See H.R. 16643, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). As a result of a House-Senate compromise
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the debtor may exempt property under any federal law other than the uni-
form exemptions, as well as under state and local law. 15  These alternatives
are mutually exclusive. The debtor may not maximize his or her exemptions
by applying state and non-Code federal exemptions to certain property and
the uniform federal exemptions to other property. 16 Therefore, the debtor
must carefully choose the alternative providing the greater advantages. The
consequences of selecting the federal alternative exemptions or the non-
uniform exemptions are best understood by comparing the two systems.
The non-uniform exemption alternative has two parts. The first part in-
cludes non-bankruptcy federal and state exemptions that are applicable on
the date the petition is filed at the place in which the debtor's domicile has
been located for the 180 days prior to the filing date. 17 The second part
extends an exemption to any interest held by the debtor "as a tenant by the
entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest . .. is exempt from
process under applicable non-bankruptcy law." l Although many states
permit jointly held property to be reached only by joint creditors, 19 such an
interest is property of the estate under the Code and is subject to adminis-
tration for the benefit of creditors unless it is exempt. 20 The second part of
the non-uniform exemption system provides such an exemption. 21 There is
nothing comparable to this exemption, however, under the federal alterna-
tive. Thus, the debtor who elects the federal alternative loses any advantages
during the closing days of the 95th Congress, however, § 522 also gives each state the power to
deny the federal alternative to its residents 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978). See 124
CONG. REC. 111, 115 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Butler). Absolute national
uniformity, therefore, is frustrated by first giving the debtor a choice between the new and old
systems and then giving each state the power to withdraw the opportunity to choose the new
system. Some states already have exercised this power. See, e.g., 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch.
79-363.
15. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(b)(2) (Supp. II 1978). This alternative continues the law of the
1898 Act. Bankniptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 548 (1897-99), as amended by Chandler
Act, ch. 575, § 6, 52 Stat. 847 (1938) (originally codified at 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)) (repealed
1979).
16. This conclusion is based on the wording of § 522(b). 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(b) (Supp. II
1978) states that a "debtor may exempt from property of the estate either (1) property that is
specified under [the uniform exemptions] . . . or, in the alternative, (2) . . . property that is
exempt under [other] Federal ... or state or local law .... " Id. (emphasis added). Even
though spouses may file a single joint petition, id. § 302(a), the Code assures that the § 522(b)
election applies individually to each spouse. Id. § 522(m). Therefore, each spouse may elect a
different exemption system. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 363 (1977).
17. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1978).
18. ld. § 522(b)(2)(B).
19. See Plumb, supra note 14, at 114-18.
20. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 541 (Supp. II 1978). The old bankruptcy law provided that prop-
erty was not included in the estate if it was immune to sequestration and not transferable under
state law. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a)(5), 30 Stat. 565 (1897-98), as amended by
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70(a)(5), 52 Stat. 879 (1938) (originally codified at 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5)
(1976)) (repealed 1979).
21. For a good discussion in this area, see Plumb, supra note 14, at 114-37; Vukowich,
supra note 14, at 1480-81.
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under state law which protect jointly owned property from invasion by cred-
itors. 22
Another consequence of choosing the uniform federal alternative is that
the debtor not only waives state exemptions but also waives federal exemp-
tions that often are taken for granted. While many of these exemptions are
duplicated in the federal alternative, 23 other important ones are not. For
example, the seventy-five percent wage garnishment limitation contained in
the Consumer Credit Act 24 was not included. Indeed, the federal alternative
contains no specific exemption for wages or salaries.
Despite these limitations, the federal alternative provides many advan-
tages to debtors. Within its scope are explicit exemptions for the debtor's
interests in a wide variety of specified properties. 25 This includes an un-
precedented exemption of up to $7,900 in any property. 26 Thus, debtors
should choose their exemption system only after performing a detailed legal
and factual analysis of their property.
THE FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE
The exemptions available to a debtor who elects 27 the federal alternative
under section 522(d) 28 are contained in eleven paragraphs, two of which
consist of five parts. Section 522(d) is characterized by a unique, unrestricted
$7,900 grubstake exemption. 29 The Code also provides for an assortment of
restricted exemptions for which there is a broad, although not universal,
consensus among existing exemption statutes. Most of the latter exemptions
22. As explained by Professor Frank R. Kennedy, who served as the Bankruptcy Commis-
sion's Executive Director: "If one opts for the federal exemption, he will give up any advantage
under state law that protects an estate by the entirety from invasion by creditors of either
spouse. If you take the federal exemption, you submit to a termination of the estate by the
entirety." Kennedy, New Bankruptcy Act Impact on Consumer Credit, 33 Bus. LAw. 1059,
1064 (1978). The sale of an estate by the entirety, as well as a non-filing co-owner's interest as a
tenant in common or joint tenant with the debtor, is permitted by the Code. 11 U.S.C. app.
§ 363(h) (Supp. II 1978). Thus, "heretofore inviolable property rights of the debtor's spouse" are
exposed to the trustee's reach. Plumb, supra note 14, at 137.
23. For example, Social Security payments, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976), and veteran benefits, 45
U.S.C. § 352(E) (1976), are duplicated in 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(10) (Supp. II 1978).
24. 15 U.S.C. app. § 1673 (Supp. II 1978).
25. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d) (Supp. II 1978).
26. See note 29 infra.
27. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
28. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d) (Supp. II 1978).
29. The figure of $7,900 is computed by reading § 522(d)(5) together with § 522(d)(1). 11
U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(5) (Supp. II 1978) provides for an exemption equal to "[t]he debtor's
aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $400 plus any unused amount of the exemption pro-
vided under paragraph (1) of this subsection, in any property." 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(1)
(Supp. 11 1978) provides for the following exemption:
The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value, in real property or
personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence,
in a cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor
uses as a residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
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contain value, use, or need limitations that generally are neither as liberal as
those in some states, nor as austere as those in others.30 Somewhat surpris-
ingly, personal earnings are not expressly exempt, and a specific exemption
for the debtor's residence or burial plot also is missing. 31
Two terms that have particular relevance to the section 522(d) exemptions
are defined in the Code. The first term is dependent, including a nonde-
pendent spouse.32  The word "dependent" is employed in the Code, rather
than "head-of-family" or "head-of-household" designations, as an element of
need and use limitations for exemptions. 33  The second definition is that of
value, meaning "fair market value as of the date of filing the petition." 3 4
Section 522(d) further defines value by exempting the debtor's interest 35 in
property, rather than the property itself. 36 It follows that the value of such
an interest in property is computed exclusive of liens. 37 For example, a
$5,000 automobile that is stibject to a $3,800 security interest is exempt
because the debtor's interest does not exceed $1,200, the amount of the
exemption. 38
The unrestricted exemption 39 permits the debtor to exempt his interest in
any property" to a value of $400, "plus any unused amount" of the $7,500
residential exemption. 40 This provision is unique among exemption statutes
and proposals. 41 The primary impact of the unrestricted exemption is to
replace the $400 limitation 42 with a $7,900 allowance for all debtors who do
30. See IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 867-901 (14th ed. 1978); Vukowich, supra note 14, at
1457-67; Vukowich, Debtor's Exemption Rights, 62 CEO. L.J. 779, 797-832 [hereinafter cited as
Exemption Rights]. With respect to the types of property exempted, there are many similarities
between § 522(d) and the Uniform Exemption Act. See UEA, supra note 14. The Code's exemptions
tend to be less generous than those provided for in the Uniform Exemption Act, with the notable
exception of the unrestricted grubstake exemption. Compare 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(2)-(4) (Supp. II
1978) with UEA, supra note 14, at § 8(a)-(c).
8(a)-8(c).
31. See text accompanying notes 44-46 infra.
32. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
33. Id. §§ 522(d)(10)(D), (E), 522 (d)(11)(B), (C), (E).34. Id. § 522(a)(2).
35. Id. § 522(d)(1)-(6), (d)(8). Other paragraphs exempt the debtor's right to receive prop-
erty. Id. § 522(d)(10)-(11).
36. Cf. UEA, supra note 14, at § 1(10), which defines "value" as the "fair market value of an
individual's interest in property, exclusive of valid liens." Because § 522(d) typically exempts the
debtor's interest in property, rather than the property itself, the differences between the Uni-
form Exemption Act's and the Code's definitions are not significant.
37. Under the Code, the debtor has the power to avoid liens on his or her property. See
notes 92, 93, and accompanying text supra.
38. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(2) (Supp. II 1978).39. td. § 522(d)(5).
40. id. § 522(d)(1).
41. Most existing statutes restrict a debtor's exemptions to types of property that are per-
ceived as necessary to sustain ordinary livelihood in modern society. See, e.g., UEA, supra note
14, at § 8(a)-(c). Statutes or proposals that resemble the Code's exemption in kind are much
more limited in amount. See, e.g., UEA, supra note 14, at § 8(d).
42. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(5) (Supp. II 1978).
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not claim residential exemptions. 43 This represents the majority of indi-
viduals who file bankruptcy.
An apparently unintended consequence of incorporating "any unused
amount" of the $7,500 residential allowance 4 into the unrestricted exemp-
tion 4 5 is the elimination of specific exemptions for residences and burial
plots. The language of the residential allowance provision becomes surplus-
age, and the unrestricted exemption is, in effect, a $7,900 allowance. This
result derives from the fact that the unrestricted allowance provision
employs the general term, "any property," which necessarily includes what-
ever property is specifically described in the exemption section pertaining to
residences. Whether a particular piece of property qualifies as "real . . . or
personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a
residence" 4 6 is immaterial; the property readily qualifies under the unre-
stricted exemption provision.
The policy implication of the merger of the residential allowance 4 7 and
the unrestricted exemption 4 is that highly favored property, such as a
homestead or burial plot, receives the same treatment under section 522(d)
as less favored property such as country club memberships, ski cabins,
gambling casino chips, wine cellars, and yachts. Likewise, departure from
the restricted property requirement proposed in the Commission Bill 49 re-
sults in treating earnings no better than lottery tickets. Of course, the unre-
stricted allowance also may be used to enhance the value of other exemption
allowances.
The probable impact of the grubstake exemption 50 is that, in the majority
of cases, the balance will tip toward election 5' of the federal alternative
43. Congress indicated that the unrestricted exemption was included "in order not to dis-
criminate against the non-homeowner." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977).
The bill proposed by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was the
forerunner to the present Act. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Com-
mission Bill]. The Commission Bill exempted "cash, securities, and receivables, including un-
paid personal earnings, accrued vacation pay and income tax refunds, to the aggregate value of
... $500." Commission Bill, supra at § 4-503(c)(3). Earnings, vacation pay, and tax refunds-
none of which are expressly exempted under § 522(d)-thus were among the assets sought to be
protected early in the evolutionary development of § 522(d)(5).
The unrestricted exemption concept has received criticism. For example, the draftsmen of the
Uniform Exemption Act rejected an exemption having the characteristics of the Code provision.
The Uniform Exemption Act, therefore, "does not reflect the view that every debtor is entitled
to a minimum grubstake for whatever purpose may please him." UEA, supra note 14, at 10.
Another commentator characterized the unrestricted exemption as "unnecessary and exorbi-
tant." Exemption Rights, supra note 30, at 1463.
44. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
45. Id. § 522(d)(5).
46. Id. § 522(d)(1).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 522(d)(5).
49. Commission Bill, supra note 43, at § 4-503(c). See Exemption Rights, supra note 30, at
1460-67.
50. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(5) (Supp. 11 1978).
51. Id. § 522(b).
1979] 1031
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exemption scheme over state and other federal exemptions. 52 Moreover, to
the extent that the section 522(d) exemption system is elected, the unre-
stricted exemption provision may be expected to curtail substantially the
number of cases in which assets are administered for the benefit of creditors.
In addition to the unrestricted allowance, section 522(d) provides for
exemptions restricted to particular types of property. The first category of
restricted exemptions includes property exempt without regard to value,
use, or need of the debtor and dependents. 53 The second category consists
of the debtor's interests in certain property valued at designated amounts. 54
Another classification includes property exempt but subject to both value
and use limitations. 55 The final group of restricted exemptions is comprised
of property interests exempt to the extent reasonably necessary 5 6 for the
support of the debtor and dependents. 57  With the exception of support
52. Of 200 individual bankrupts who commenced cases in the Northern District of California
during December, 1978, slightly less than 20% had property that enabled them to take advan-
tage of California's generous homestead exemptions. For most of the balance of bankrupts, the
$7,900 grubstake exemption would have been considerably more attractive. L. Russel, Report of
Homestead Claims in Cases Filed in the United States District Court, Bankruptcy Court,
Alameda and Contra Costa Counties, in December, 1978 (Jan. 25, 1979) (unpublished study in
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Cal., Oakland).
53. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(7) (Supp. II 1978) (unmatured life insurance policy); id.
§ 522(d)(9) (health aids); id. § 522(d)(10)(A) (Social Security benefits, unemployment compensa-
tion, local public assistance); id. § 522(d)(10)(C) (temporary disability, illness, or unemployment
benefits); id. § 522(d)(11)(A) (crime victim's award). The insurance policy exemption is designed
to prevent the trustee from surrendering a policy on the debtor's life and thereby causing it to
lapse. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977). The Code further protects
against the lapse of a life insurance policy by allowing the insurer, when permitted by contract,
to use any value in the policy to pay premiums. 11 U.S.C. app. § 542(d) (Supp. II 1978).
54. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1978) (one motor vehicle; $1,200); id. § 522(d)(8)
(cash value of life insurance policy; $4,000); id. § 522(d)(11)(D) (personal bodily injury award;
$7,500). The $4,000 insurance allowance included within this category represents a departure
from the virtually unlimited insurance exemptions provided for in many states. See, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-208 (1947); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.14 (West 1977); ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 73, § 850 (West 1977). OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 2410, 2510, 2720 (West 1976).
The injury payments that are exempted under this category are to be distinguished from
payments for "pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss," which are not
exempt. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(3)(11)(D) (Supp. II 1978). The House Report explained that this
provision is "designed to cover payments ... [for) actual bodily injury, such as loss of a limb,
and is not intended to include the attendant costs that accompany such a loss, such as . . . loss
of earnings." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 362 (1977).
The exemptions with value limitations are not indexed to the cost of living, unlike those in
the Uniform Exemption Act. See, UEA, supra note 14, at § 2. The Code, however, directs the
Judicial Conference of the United States to recommend adjustments in dollar amounts to the
Congress and the President every six years, commencing in 1985. 11 U.S.C. app. § 104 (Supp.
II 1978).
55. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(3) (Supp. II 1978) (property held for personal, family, or house-
hold use; $200 per item); id. § 522(d)(4) (jewelry); id. § 522(d)(6) (property used in the debtor's
trade; $750).
56. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text infra.
57. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(10)(D) (Supp. II 1978) (support and alimony payments); id.
522(d)(10)(E) (stock bonus and pension payments); id. § 522(d)(11)(B) (wrongful death award);
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payments, the types of property exempted by the latter category generally
will involve large amounts of money. The "reasonably necessary" test, there-
fore, is the battleground upon which debtors holding such assets and their
creditors will meet.
Neither the Code nor any legislative history report defines "reasonably
necessary." The Commission Bill, first proposing this limitation, 58 also was
silent. 59 Similar terminology, however, has been construed by various state
courts. 60 Further guidance in defining "reasonably necessary" may be found
in the Uniform Exemption Act. 61 In view of the evolutionary relationship
id. § 522(d)(11)(C) (insurance proceeds); id. § 522(d)(11)(E) (payment in compensation of loss of
future earnings).
The spousal-support-payment exemption is somewhat illusory. For example, it may be dif-
ficult to establish a debtor's need with respect to past due support payments. Also, in a case
involving a debtor's right to future support payments, an order based on a finding of insufficient
need would place the bankruptcy court in a domestic relations stance. Finally, only true support
payments are covered; obligations, such as payments representing a division of property, are not
exempt. Adler v. Nicholas, 381 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1967); In re Fiorio, 128 F.2d 562, 563
(7th Cir. 1942). See Plumb, supra note 14, at 32. Child support payments owed to the debtor
are not explicitly exempted in the Code. Such amounts due on behalf of a child usually are
considered trust funds and are beyond the reach of the bankruptcy trustee. See, e.g., In re
Gardner, 243 F. Supp. 258 (D. Or. 1965). See also Plumb, supra note 14, at 32.
A second provision in this category warranting special comment is the exemption for pension
payments and other permanent employment benefits. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(10)(E) (Supp. II
1978). No distinction is drawn between public and private employment benefits. In some in-
stances, private employment benefits based on age or length of service are denied exemption,
unless the plan or contract qualifies for tax deferral under the Internal Revenue Code. Id. This
exception applies only if the debtor is employed by an insider, such as a partnership in which
the debtor is a general partner or a corporation in which the debtor is a director, officer, or
person in control. Id. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 101(25)(A) (Supp. II 1978). Temporary benefits are
unlimited in amount, whereas permanent benefits are subject to the "reasonably necessary"
test. Id. § 522(d)(10)(E). See notes 58-62 and accompanying text infra.
58. Commission Bill, supra note 43, at § 4-503.
59. See Plumb, supra note 14, at 94.
60. See, e.g., in re Brown's Estate, 35 N.Y.S.2d 646, 648, 650 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 264
App. Div. 824, 35 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1942) (the court took into consideration the manner of living to
which bankrupt beneficiary of trust had been accustomed); Sillick v. Mason, 2 Barb. 79 (1847)
(defendant brought up with improvident habits and without learning to care for property was
not expected to maintain himself and his family as comfortably on same amount as industrious
business man). Cf. Canfield v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 13 Cal. 2d 1, 87 P.2d 830 (1939)
(creditors are not required to defer to expenditures for excessive entertaining. and luxuries);
Tolles v. Wood, 99 N.Y. 616, 1 N.E. 251 (1885) (creditors need not defer to expenditures for
extravagant life style).
61. Section 6(b) of the Uniform Exemption Act defines property reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and his or her dependents as "property required to meet the present and
anticipated needs of the individual and his or her dependents, as determined by the court after
consideration of the individual's responsibilities and all the present and anticipated property and
income of the individual, including that which is exempt." UEA, supra note 14, at § 6(b). The
comment to § 6(b) notes that these standards differ from those "generally governing ... what is
... allowable . . . as alimony and support or as a distribution to a beneficiary under a support
trust." UEA, supra note 14, at 25. The comment also indicates that "[r]ather than focusing on
the debtor's station in life and the standard of living to which he has been accustomed, the
definition requires the court to direct its attention to the individual's needs and respon-
sibilities." Id.
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between the Commission Bill, the Uniform Exemption Act, and the Code,
the Uniform Exemption Act's definition and comments carry great
weight. 62 Once a court has determined that an exemption involving future
payments, such as pensions or other permanent employment benefits, ex-
ceeds the debtor's reasonable needs, the problem of realizing the excess for
the benefit of creditors arises. 63
Tracing-the right to preserve an exemption as it changes form- 64 is
greatly restricted under section 522(d). It is expressly permitted only as to
one category of property.6 5 It is reasonable to conclude that section 522(d)
precludes other tracing. First, the draftsmen's use of the concept in only one
section suggests it was deliberately withheld as to all other property in-
terests. Moreover, tracing generally is less important in the static bank-
ruptcy context-where exemption rights are determined as of one point in
time-than in the non-bankruptcy context. 66  Finally, the unrestricted
exemption 67 may be viewed as an alternative to tracing. The denial of trac-
ing is particularly significant with respect to exemptions of the debtor's
"right to receive" various benefits or payments. 68  In the absence of tracing,
the received payment no longer is exempt under the Code, and the debtor
must utilize the unrestricted exemption 69 to protect such assets.
It also is noteworthy that section 522(d) contains no exemptions for per-
sonal earnings. Wages and salaries, therefore, are exempt only under the
unrestricted allowance provision. 70 According to one commentator, the
exemption of earnings is "Itihe most significant exemption for most debtors." 71
The absence of a specific earnings exemption, however, has no consequence
62. In contrast to the Uniform Exemption Act's approach discussed in note 61 supra, the
California courts have construed a comparable "necessary" limitation in terms of the debtor's
social class and customary standard of living. See, e.g., In re Westhem, 459 F. Supp. 556 (C.D.
Cal. 1978) (bankrupt was permitted to exempt a four carat diamond ring). One commentator
advocates that "reasonably necessary" be construed by an objective standard, namely as
"reasonably essential to or needed by an average and reasonable person." Exemption Rights,
supra note 30, at 1462. Applying that standard to life insurance proceeds, he assumes they
would not be exempt to a debtor "who was able to work since the benefits would not be
necessary for such a person's support." Id. at 1461.
63. The problem has been assessed as follows: "Apparently, when there is an excess, the
trustee may sell the right to it, hold open the estate so as to collect the income, or reach the
fund itself." Plumb, supra note 14, at 58.
64. For example, tracing allows an exemption to be preserved as it changes form from the
exempt right to receive a payment, to payment in the form of a check, to a bank deposit, and
ultimately to cash proceeds.
65. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(11) (Supp. 11 1978).
66. See Exemption Rights, supra note 30, at 836-37.
67. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(5) (Supp. 11 1978).
68. Id. § 522(d)(10).
69. ld. § 522(d)(5).
70. Id.
71. See Exemption Rights, supra note 30, at 813. Virtually all states protect personal earn-
ings from judicial process to some extent, and some states prohibit any garnishment of wages.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.11 (West 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1171.1 (West
1976); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 866 (Purdon 1966). The Federal Consumer Credit Protec-
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with respect to wages earned subsequent to the commencement of the
case.
72
STATUS OF EXEMPT PROPERTY
Sections 541(a)(1) 73 and 522(b) 74 of the Code operate together to establish
two concepts. First, all of the debtor's property at the commencement of the
case comprises an estate, and second, the individual debtor is permitted to
exempt certain property interests from the property of the estate. 75 The
removal would appear to be retroactive to the commencement of the case
because, with one exception, exempt property "is not liable for payment of
any administrative expense." 76  The converse follows, however, and the es-
tate is not liable for any liens or charges, such as storage costs, that are
attributable to exempt property.
Once property has been removed from the estate under either exemption
system, it remains free from the subsequent claims of most creditors. 77 Any
property that is exempted under this section "is not liable during or after the
case for debt . . . that arose . . . before the commencement of the case." 78
Without this provision, property set aside to the debtor pursuant to the
federal alternative could be vulnerable under state law to creditors holding
non-dischargeable claims.
Exceptions to the general rule found in section 522(c) include non-dis-
charged taxes 7 9 and family support obligations. 80 These exceptions are con-
tions Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-93R (1976), limits garnishment of wages to no more than 25% of
disposable earnings. Id. § 1673(a)(1).
The forerunner of the unrestricted exemption provision was intended by the Commission to
harbor earnings. See Commission Bill, supra note 43, at § 4-503(c)(3). See also Plumb, supra
note 14, at 27. An approach similar to that adopted by the Commission was followed in the
Uniform Exemption Act, which expressly allows the application of the cash exemption to "un-
paid earnings not otherwise exempt." UEA, supra note 14, at § 8(d). The preceding passage
refers to the "assumption ... that personal earnings are now appropriately taken care of by"
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act. Id. at
11. That assumption does not apply to § 522(d) because neither state nor non-bankruptcy federal
exemptions are available to the debtor who elects the federal alternative. 11 U.S.C. app.
§ 522(b) (Supp. II 1978).
72. 11 U.S.C. app. § 541(a)(6) (Supp. 11 1978). But see 11 U.S.C. app. § 1306(a)(2) (Supp. II
1978), which provides that earnings from services performed after commencement of the case
would be included as property of the estate.
73. See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra.
74. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra.
75. Congress stated that § 541(a)(1) "includes as property of the estate all property of the
debtor, even that needed for a fresh start. After the property comes into the estate, then the
debtor is permitted to exempt it." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 368 (1977).
76. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(k) (Supp. 11 1978). The exception is confined to expenses attribut-
able to avoidance or transfers affecting exempt property. See note 120 infra.
77. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(c) (Supp. II 1978).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 522(c)(1).
80. Id. § 522(e)(1).
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sistent with the general rule that otherwise exempt property is liable for
taxes8 l and for spouse and child support obligations. 82 Also excepted from
the provisions of section 522(c) are liens that are not avoided and tax liens
that are voided provided notice is properly filed. 83 The Code "will not
prevent enforcement of valid liens . . . on exempt property." 84
Section 522(c) thus serves three objectives. First, it protects section 522(d)
property after bankruptcy. Second, it creates a uniform policy concerning
debts that may be satisfied from exempt property. Finally, it provides that
consensual liens, generally, and nonconsensual tax liens, in particular, may
be enforced on exempt property.
AVOIDANCE OF LIENS ON EXEMPT PROPERTY
The Code's grant to the debtor of avoiding powers on exempt property
rivals the uniform exemption scheme of section 522(d) in importance and its
unrestricted grubstake exemption in novelty. There is a paucity of precedent
for this in prior bankruptcy laws. The old Act provided limited authority to
avoid judicial liens in favor of the debtor. 85 It also contained a narrow
exception to a proviso that expressly denied exemption rights in property
transferred or concealed by the bankrupt and recovered by the trustee. 86
The avoiding powers set out in the Code, 87 however, go far beyond what-
81. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(c)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
82. See Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Exemption Rights, supra
note 30, at 852-53. California, however, adheres to the minority view and expressly protects
exempt property from state taxes. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.51 (West Supp. 1978). Fur-
thermore, California courts do not distinguish between support and non-support judgments in
applying exemption laws. See, e.g., Miller v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. 2d 14, 442 P.2d 663, 69
Cal. Rptr. 583 (1968). Tax collectors and frustrated spousal-support judgment holders in Califor-
nia and similar states can be expected to initiate involuntary bankruptcy actions against debtors
with substantial exempt property interests such as homesteads, life insurance, and pensions.
83. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
84. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977). Both the Senate and the House
accepted the rule of Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1880), which stated that a discharge in
bankruptcy did not affect a valid lien on exempt property. Id. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 78 (1978).
85. Under the old Bankruptcy Act, liens obtained against the property of a debtor by an
unsecured creditor by legal proceedings within four months before filing the petition could be
avoided if the debtor was insolvent when the lien was obtained. Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1898, ch. 541, § 67, 30 Stat. 564 (1897-99), as amended by Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67, 52 Stat.
875 (originally codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1976)) (repealed 1979). See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.
v. Hall, 229 U.S. 511 (1913) (property is withdrawn from the estate not for the purpose of being
subjected to liens, but on the supposition that it needed no protection because they had been
nullified).
86. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 548 (1897-99), as amended by
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 6, 52 Stat. 847 (1938) (originally codified at 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976))
(repealed 1979).
87. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(f)-(k) (Supp. H 1978).
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ever powers the bankrupt had under the old law in concept and even farther
in application.
There are two types. of avoiding powers: those directly granted to the
debtor8 8 and those the debtor shares with, or derives from, the trustee. 89
The powers held solely by the debtor are found in section 522(f), allowing
the debtor to avoid "the fixing of a lien on . . . property to the extent that
such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been enti-
tled" if the lien is of a specified type. 90 Two types of liens are specified as
qualifying for avoidance. The first, and more important type, is a judicial
lien. 9' Because the Code imposes no limitation for avoiding a judicial lien
this power is of great practical importance to debtors. This power also is
significant because it applies to judicial liens on real as well as personal
property. 92 The second type of lien that can be avoided by a debtor is a
non-possessory, non-purchase-money security interest in a particularly fa-
vored class of exempt property. 93  Only personal property, described gener-
ally as household goods, tools of trade, or health aids, qualifies for this avoid-
ing power. 94
The balance of the debtor's avoiding powers is derived from the trustee
under section 5 2 2 (g)9 5 or shared with the trustee under section 522(h). 96 In
order to avoid a lien under these powers, the property must qualify as
exempt except for its transfer or lien; it must not have been concealed; and
the lien or transfer must have been involuntary. 97
88. Id. § 522(0.
89. Id. § 522(g)-(i).
90. Id. § 522(0.
91. The concept of judicial liens on exempt property would appear to be a contradiction of
terms. A judicial lien, however, may be obtained on property capable of being transformed from
nonexempt into exempt property by means of a mere formality. For example, California
homestead property only is exempt from the time the written declaration of homestead is placed
on public record. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1244 (West 1954). A judgment lien, therefore, is unaf-
fected by a subsequently recorded homestead declaration. Id. §§ 1241(1), 1241(4). Although
such factual-legal circumstances are grist for the Code's avoiding powers mill, they are relatively
rare. Thus, the more frequent application of these powers will arise as a result of judicial liens
on property that is exempt under the federal alternative but is not exempt under state law.
92. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(f)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
93, Id. § 522(f)(2). The nonpossessory exclusion protects a pawnbroker's lien. The non-
purchase money qualification limits application of this provision to lenders.
94. Id. Because small loan companies tend to take security interests in such personal prop-
erty, presumably they will be affected more often by § 522(f)(2) of the Code than other groups
of lenders.
95. Id. § 522(g).
96. Id. § 522(h). See also id. § 522(i).
97. Id. § 522(g)-(h). By restricting the debtor's right under § 522, subsections (g) and (h), to
involuntary transfers, the Code departs from a line of cases that permit the debtor to exempt property
the trustee has recovered as a preference or a fraudulent conveyance. Vukowich, supra note 14, at 1479.
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Accordingly, these powers derived under section 522, subsections (g) and
(h), are relatively narrow. They only have possible application to involuntary
preferences,9" statutory liens, 99 avoidable setoffs, 10 0 and property held by a
non-custodian. 1 1 Further, section 522(f) is a simpler basis for invalidating
preferential judicial liens, 10 2 except to the extent that constitutional consid-
erations make it inapplicable to pre-existing liens. 10 3
The derivative powers found in section 522(g) permit the debtor to exempt
property that the trustee recovers under various provisions of the Code. 104
The debtor may not exercise these avoiding powers if the trustee fails to act
or if there is no trustee in the case. The rights included in section 522(g) are
not the traditional avoiding powers. These rights concern equitable subordi-
nation, l05 turnover of property by one other than a custodian, 106 turnover
of property by a custodian, 107 and setoffs. 108 Section 522(g), however, also
provides that the debtor may exempt property the trustee recovers under
section 550, establishing the liability of one who receives an avoided trans-
fer, 109 and under section 551, automatically preserving avoided tranfers for
the benefit of the estate. 110 The inclusion of these latter two sections is
significant in that through them traditional avoiding powers are incorporated
into section 522(g). This occurs because sections 550 and 551 are applicable
to avoidance of transfer sections of the Code other than those delineated in
section 522(g). "'
Contra, Gardner v. Johnson, 195 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1952). There is an exception to the limitation that a
debtor's rights under § 522(g) apply only to involuntary transfers of property that were not concealed.
Property subject to a consensual line that could be avoided under § 522(f)(2) is not subject to these
requirements. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(g)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
98. 11 U.S.C. app. § 547 (Supp. 11 1978). This section includes judicial liens that qualify as
preferences.
99. Id. § 545.
100. Id. § 553.
101. Id. § 542.
102. See notes 90-94 and accompanying text supra.
103. See note 151 and accompanying text infra.
104. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(g) (Supp. 11 1978).
105. Id. § 510(c)(2).
106. Id. § 542.
107. Id. § 543.
108. Id. § 553.
109. Id. § 550. In this way the Code distinguishes the concept of avoiding a transfer and of
recovering from the transferee. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1977).
110. 11 U.S.C. app. § 551 (Supp. II 1978).
111. See 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 544, 545, 547-549, 724(a) (Supp. II 1978). For example, even
though § 522(g) does not expressly permit exemption of property whose transfer was avoided by
the trustee under the preference section of the Code, § 547, such an act is allowed due to the
recovery of this property under § 550.
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The shared powers found in section 522(h) permit the debtor to exercise
the trustee's traditional avoiding powers in the event of the trustee's inac-
tion. 112 The specific rights extended to the debtor involve the strong arm
powers, 113 statutory liens, 114 preferences, 115 fraudulent transfers, 116 post-
petition transactions, 117 and liens securing liabilities for other than actual
pecuniary loss."" The trustee's non-traditional powers of avoidance or recov-
ery are not permitted to the debtor under section 522(h) except with regard
to setoffs. 119 Once a lien or transfer pursuant to section 522(h) has been
avoided, the debtor may recover from the transferee or preserve the lien. 120
Closely associated with the debtor's powers to avoid liens is the debtor's
ability to redeem certain tangible personal property from a lien securing a
dischargeable consumer debt. Property that is "primarily intended for per-
sonal, family, or household use may be redeemed by the debtor under sec-
tion 722 of the Code by paying the value of the collateral. 121 Section 722,
however, is applicdble only in liquidation cases. 122
A debtor may redeem property that is exempt or abandoned to the debtor
by the trustee. 1 23  Even though the language of section 722 may be read to
limit the ability to redeem property to the debtor's exempt interest, 124 it
112. 11 U.s.c. app. § 522(h) (Supp. II 1978). Any limitations on the trustees avoiding pow-
ers that are found in § 546 of the Act apply to the debtor exercising the shared avoidance
powers. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 363 (1977).
113. 11 U.S.C. app. § 544 (Supp. 11 1978).





119. Id. § 522(h).
120. ld. § 522(i). Thus, § 522(i) serves the debtor in the same way that 99550 and 551 serve
the trustee. See notes 109-111 and accompanying text supra. It must be emphasized that the
property recoverable by the debtor under either § 522(g) or § 522(i) must qualify as exempt
property under the Code. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(j) (Supp. II 1978). The debtor, therefore, may
not recover more from the estate than the exempt property quota. The trustee is authorized to
charge for expenses incurred in avoiding transfers and in recovering property that is released to
the debtor as exempt. The amount chargeable is defined as "the aliquot share of the costs and
expenses" incurred. Id. § 522(k)(1). The debtor also must pay any costs and expenses 'personally
incurred. Id. § 522(k)(2).
121. 11 U.S.C. app. § 722 (Supp. II 1978). This is true whether or not the debtor has waived
the right to redeem the property. Id.
122. This limitation is due to the fact that § 722 is located in chapter 7 of the Code. In
contrast, due to its location in chapter 5 of the Code, § 522 is applicable to cases administered
under chapter 7 (liquidation), chapter 11 (reorganization), and chapter 13 (individuals with regu-
lar income). Id. § 103(a).
123. Id. § 722.
124. Section 722 provides that tangible personal property may be redeemed "if such property
is exempted under section 522." Id.
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would appear that section 722 was intended to extend to the whole of the
property, 125 and thus to the debtor's advantage.' 2 6
Redemption under section 722 contemplates ridding the collateral of the
lien upon payment of its value to the secured party. 127 If the parties are
not able to agree on the value, the court will determine the amount of the
allowed secured claim. 128 In the absence of agreement, payment must be
cash because section 722 conditions redemption upon payment. 129 This re-
quirement will limit use of the redemption right by those debtors who are
unable to pay cash for more expensive property. 130
PROCEDURAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure are expected to prescribe the proce-
dure and time constraints for: (1) making the section 522(b) election between
exemption systems; (2) specifying the property claimed; and (3) objecting to
exemption claims. Although some procedure has been codified, 131 those
125. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 380-81 (1977).
126. For example, if a bankrupt owned a $2,000 car, subject to a $1,200 lien, the debtor
could exempt an $800 interest in the car under the uniform federal alternative that provides for
a $1,200 motor vehicle exemption. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1978). Section 722 now
will permit the debtor to pay off the $1,200 lien and redeem the entire car, not just the remain-
ing $400 left over from the exemption. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 381
(1977).
127. Payment of only the value of the collateral is provided by the clause in § 722 which
states that redemption occurs upon payment of "the amount of the allowed secured claim." 11
U.S.C. app. § 722 (Supp. 11 1978). The phrase "allowed secured claim" derives from § 506(a) of
the Code, which provides that an "allowed claim ... is a secured claim to the extent of the
value of such creditor's interest . . . in such property." Id. § 506(a). Section 506(a) "abolishes
the use of terms 'secured creditor' and 'unsecured creditor' and substitutes the terms 'secured
claim' and 'unsecured claim.' " H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977).
By providing for redemption upon payment of only the value of the claim, § 722 is the
equivalent of the "cram down" provision used in other chapters of the Code. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
app. §§ 1129(b)(2)(A). 1325(a)(5)(B) (Supp. II 1978). Section 722 redemption differs from the
Uniform Commercial Code where collateral may be redeemed only upon payment of the full
amount owing plus costs. U.C.C. § 9-506.
128. Because value as used in § 722 is undefined in the Code, "courts will have to determine
value on a case-by-case basis." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977).
129. Section 722 states that redemption may occur only upon "paying the holder of the lien."
11 U.S.C. app. § 722 (Supp. 11 1978).
130. One commentator has pointed out that "in cases involving larger assets such as au-
tomobiles and in cases involving poorer debtors . . . the right to redeem is either meaningless
or the exercise of the right to redeem creates substantial hardship." Vukowich, supra note 14,
at 471. While § 722 does not provide for deferred payments of the redemption amount, agree-
ments to this effect are contemplated by the Code. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 524(c)(4)(B) (Supp. II
1978). This provision excepts good faith redemption agreements from the general restriction on
reaffirmations.
131. A list of property claimed exempt must be filed either by the debtor or by a dependent.
11 U.S.C. app. § 522(i) (Supp. 11 1978). It is likely that the rules promulgated will require the
list to be filed reasonably soon after commencement of the case. Two provisions, however,
mandate opportunities to amend at later dates. Property of the estate that can be exempted
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portions of the present rule 403 132 that are not inconsistent with section
522 will control until new rules are promulgated.
An exemption waiver executed in favor of a creditor who holds an unse-
cured claim is denied effect. 133 Security interests granted in exempt prop-
erty, however, are unaffected by this provision. 134 Similarly, any waivers of
avoiding or recovery powers are unenforceable. 135 It should be noted that
exemptions are not allowable out of property that is fraudulently ob-
tained,' 36 although conversion of nonexempt property into an exempt in-
terest on the eve of bankruptcy is not in itself fraudulent. 137
Under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, the doctrine of Lockwood v. Exchange
Bank 138 denied bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over property after it had
been exempted to the bankrupt. The broad jurisdiction that Congress has
extended to bankruptcy courts in other legislation, however, destroys
Lockwood's foundation. 139 Accordingly, there now is statutory authority for
the bankruptcy court to determine controversies between the bankrupt and
third parties over property the trustee has set apart as exempt. 140 More
importantly, bankruptcy courts also have the jurisdiction to enforce the
post-bankruptcy status of exempt property. 141
Several constitutional issues deserve consideration. The first question
raised is whether the Code exemption provisions 142 affect creditors or debt-
ors retrospectively. A second issue presented is whether certain lien avoid-
ance powers 143 provided for the benefit of the debtor can be applied either
prospectively or retrospectively. There also is some question as to whether
by the debtor is defined as certain assets, such as inheritances, property settlements, and life
insurance proceeds, acquired within 180 days of the date of filing. Id. § 541(a)(5). The recovery
and avoiding powers under the Code can be exercised many months, if not years, after the
filing date, and it is expressly contemplated that this property may be claimed as exempt. Id.§522 (g)-(i)
132. FED. R. BANK. P. 403.
133. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(e) (Supp. II 1978).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Miguel v. Walsh, 447 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1971); In re White, 221 F. Supp. 64 (E.D.
Cal. 1963).
137. See Wudrick v. Clements, 451 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1971). Neither of these principles is
addressed by the Code, although the House of Representatives did refer to the latter rule in
reporting on this legislation. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977).
138. 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
139. A broad jurisdiction grant is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976). Congress stated that
"[t]he adjunct bankruptcy court will exercise ... jurisdiction . . . [over] everything that arises
in a bankruptcy case." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 153 (1978).
140. Presumably this will include replevin actions by secured creditors for possession of their
collateral or a money judgment for its value.
141. See notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
142. 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(d) (Supp. II 1978).
143. Id. § 522(f)-(i).
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the lien redemption provision 144 is applicable either prospectively or retro-
spectively. Finally, it remains to be determined whether one who is not in
bankruptcy can be divested of an interest in property on the basis of being a
co-owner of the property with a debtor. 145
In the absence of other constitutional constraints, the power granted to
Congress under the bankruptcy clause 146 justifies an affirmative answer to
each of the preceding questions. The contract clause, 147 interpreted as for-
bidding retrospective application of new state exemptions to existing
debt, 148 is a limitation on state laws only. Thus, the question becomes
whether or not the noted provisions amount to depriving a person of prop-
erty without due process of law, as forbidden by the fifth amendment.14 9
In general, the courts have not characterized the expectations of either
debtors or creditors that are affected by exemption laws as rising to the level
of property interests. 150
Security interests, however, are recognized as property interests, 151 and
any retrospective application of lien avoidance powers is therefore constitu-
tionally suspect. There is no problem as to security interests created after
the effective date of the Code because they are subject to, and limited by,
the appreciable avoidance power provision. In summary, it appears that
there may be serious constitutional questions only as to the retrospective
application of avoidance laws to existing property interests.
144. Id. § 722.
145. Id. § 363(h).
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
147. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
148. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 553-54 (1949); Blount v.
Windley, 95 U.S. 173, 180 (1877); In re Inland Dredging Corp., 61 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1932),
cert. denied sub nom. Baker v. Fisher, 288 U.S. 611 (1933); Piedmont Memorial Hosp. v. Guil-
ford County, 221 N.C. 308, 311, 20 N.E.2d 332, 334 (1942). Several courts have held that
the contract clause prohibits states from legislating to enlarge exemptions, as this would impair
the obligation on contracts with creditors by substantially lessening their value. See W.B.
Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934); Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U.S. 126
(1921); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1878); Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1837);
In re Rauer's Collection Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 248, 196 P.2d 803 (1948).
Some courts have held that states may eliminate a debtor's previous exemptions of property
without impairing contract obligations or depriving the debtor of property without due process.
See Sponger v. Cumpton, 54 Ga. 355 (1875); Petrulionis v. Dudek, 113 I11. App. 2d 398, 252
N.E.2d 23 (1969); Leak v. Gay, 107 N.C. 468, 12 S.E. 312 (1890); Brearley School v. Ward, 201
N.Y. 358, 94 N.E. 1001 (1911); Laird v. Carton, 196 N.Y. 169, 89 N.E. 822 (1909); Chandler v.
Horne, 23 Ohio App. 1, 154 N.E. 748 (1926). See also Plumb, supra note 14, at 137-43.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
150. See Plumb, supra note 14, at 143.
151. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589-602 (1935); Tahoe
Nat'l Bank v. Philips, 4 Cal. 3d 11, 480 P.2d 320, 92 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1971); Greve v. Leger, 64
Cal. 2d 853, 415 P.2d 824, 52 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1966); American Mach. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 92 Idaho
416, 443 P.2d 1013 (1968).
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CONCLUSION
The exemption scheme set forth in section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code is
vast and far-reaching. There is the new system of federal exemptions, which
the debtor may choose in lieu of existing state and non-federal exemptions.
The most distinguishing feature of the federal alternative is the $7,900
exemption in any property. The debtor is also provided with broad powers
to avoid liens on, or involuntary transfers of, exempt property. All of this
makes bankruptcy a more attractive alternative than it has been in the past,
furthering as it does the principle of a fresh start for the debtor.

